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INTRODUCTION
A decade ago, many antitrust commentators were predicting a
"revival"' of franchise antitrust claims flowing in the wake of Eastman
Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc.2  The thinking was that
Kodak's recognition of a claim for monopolization of an "aftermarket" for
parts and services separate from each other and from a primary product
might be extended to cover franchise relationships in which the franchisee
is required to purchase fungible products from its franchisor, even though
those products could be purchased elsewhere on more favorable terms.
Fairly quickly, though, the Third Circuit decided Queen City Pizza, Inc. v.
Domino's Pizza, Inc., which held that a Kodak-type antitrust claim will not
lie for allegations that a franchisor "forced" unwanted-but contractually
agreed-to-purchases of products on franchisees in the course of the
franchise relationship.3 That case continues to bedevil franchisees suing
under antitrust theories.4 This Article looks back at the Queen City Pizza
legacy and where, as a consequence, franchise antitrust litigation stands
today.
Franchisees have attacked restrictions on their ability to deal in
products purchased from third parties (i.e., from a party other than their
franchisor) under a number of overlapping antitrust theories (other theories
of recovery, like breach of contract, are often alleged as well): improper
exclusive dealing, tying, aftermarket monopolization, and price
discrimination. Part One sets the historical backdrop against which
franchise relationships are formed and-when these relationships sour-
allegations of antitrust violations play out. Part Two examines the antitrust
1. See, e.g., Janet L. McDavid & Richard M. Steuer, The Revival of Franchise Antitrust
Claims, 67 ANTITRUST L.J. 209, 212 (1999); Tony Lin, Distinguishing Kodak Lock-in And
Franchise Contractual Lock-in, 23 S. ILL. U. L.J. 87, 87 (1998) (remarking on the rise in cases
post-Kodak). But see Allan P. Hillman, Franchise Tying Claims: Revolution or Just a "Kodak
Moment"?, 21 FRANCHISE L.J. 1, 37 (2001) ("Although Kodak revived franchise antitrust tying
claims, it is likely that this revival will be ephemeral.").
2. 504 U.S. 451 (1992) (addressing the issue of whether Eastman Kodak had unlawfully tied
the aftermarket sale of service for Kodak copying machines to the sale of parts for those
machines).
3. 124 F.3d 430, 440, 443 (3d Cir. 1997).
4. See, e.g., Schlotzsky's, Ltd. v. Sterling Purchasing and Nat'l Distribution Co., 520 F.3d
393, 408 (5th Cir. 2008) (finding that under Queen City Pizza the franchisor's requirement that the
franchisee change suppliers "was not an antitrust 'tying arrangement' because it was not an
exercise of market power but of contract power"); Beuff Enters. Fla., Inc. v. Villa Pizza, LLC, No.
07-2159, 2008 WL 2565008, at *6 (D.N.J. June 25, 2008) (following Queen City Pizza in
dismissing plaintiffs' antitrust claims "because Plaintiffs are bound by contract (not by
uniqueness) to purchase certain mandated supplies" and therefore "no relevant antitrust market
exists").
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theories emanating from Kodak, as well as a couple of others that are pled
from time to time in similar cases, and shows how these theories (1) have
developed generally and (2) have been applied in the context of franchise
disputes. Part Three moves to a specific discussion of how Kodak, when
passed through the lens of Queen City Pizza, impacts restrictions on a
franchisee's ability to deal with third parties.
I. FRANCHISING AND ITS GENERAL BACKGROUND
Franchising, as a method of doing business, traces its roots to the mid-
nineteenth century and to the distribution techniques of the Singer Sewing
Machine Company.! Singer's genius was to yoke product distribution and
financing with standardized business methods and quality control.
Numerous companies followed Singer's lead, and, by the end of World War
II, franchising was a standard way of doing business.6 But the legal
framework was not so quickly established. Even a lay perspective is
sufficient to see that there is no bright line to be drawn between a
"distributorship" and a "franchise."8  Accordingly, both state legislatures
and federal agencies began in the post-War era to draft regulations designed
to clarify what business relations are to be considered "franchises" and
those that are not.9 For example, the Federal Trade Commission defines the
term "franchise" to include, among other things, "any continuing
commercial relationship" under which a person sells goods or services that
carry another person's trade or service mark and the other person has the
authority to dictate quality standards and methods of operation.10
Nonetheless, some regulatory schemes cast the term so broadly as to define
5. 1 W. MICHAEL GARNER, FRANCHISE AND DISTRIBUTION LAW AND PRACTICE § 1:8 (2d.
ed. 2009).
6. Id. § 1:9.
7. Id.
8. For example, BLACK'S defines a "distributorship" as "[a] franchise held by a person or
company who sells merchandise, usu. in a specific area to individual customers" and it defines a
"commercial franchise" as a "franchise using local capital and management by contracting with
third parties to operate a facility identified as offering a particular brand of goods or services."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).
9. See Thomas M. Pitegoff, Franchise Relationship Laws: A Minefield for Franchisors, 45
Bus. LAW. 289, 289, 319 (1989) (discussing the franchise-franchisee relationship under various
state laws); see also 1 GARNER, supra note 5, §§ 5:14-:39 (detailing the franchise laws of a
number of states).
10. 16 C.F.R. § 436.1(h) (2010).
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away any distinction between a franchise and an ordinary distributorship."
For purposes of this Article, the definitional subtleties matter little, and
readers will be on safe ground if they focus their thinking on well-known
franchise operations that sell fast food or branded products like health
supplements. 12  Of signal importance here is that the typical franchise
relationship is built around a highly formalized written agreement.
II. KODAK AND THE CONCEPT OF ANTICOMPETITIVE AFTERMARKET
CONDUCT
In the nearly two decades since the United States Supreme Court
announced its decision in Kodak," countless plaintiffs have attempted to
state claims based on a "lock-in" theory.14 Very few of these plaintiffs have
been successful, in large part because they have too often tried to shoehorn
ordinary commercial disputes into the Kodak holding.15 That holding is
narrow and-because the case came from the Supreme Court in an unusual
11. E.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-72-202 (2001) (defining "franchise" to include "a written or
oral agreement . . . to sell or distribute goods or services within an exclusive or nonexclusive
territory at wholesale or retail .... ); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 817.416(b) (West 2006) (including the
terms "franchise" and "distributorship" in the same definition).
12. See 1 GARNER, supra note 5, § 1:2 ("From a legal standpoint, the distinctions between
franchises and distributorships are frequently blurred.").
13. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992).
14. The Kodak "lock-in" theory is part of a "tying" claim brought under section I of the
Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). See 2 GARNER, supra note 5, §§ 11:24, :27; see also
discussion infra Part II.A. Generally, plaintiffs claim that the defendant exerted its market power
to force the plaintiff, for example, to accept supracompetitive prices or purchase tied products.
See GARNER, supra note 5, § 11:27. Since the consumer is already "locked-in" by the agreement
and its investment, the cost of switching to a substitute is prohibitive and thus it has no choice but
to use the tied product. See, e.g., Queen City Pizza, Inc. v. Domino's Pizza, Inc., 124 F.3d 430,
439 (3d Cir. 1997); Subsolutions, Inc. v. Doctor's Assocs., Inc., No. 3:98-CV-470IAHN, 2001
WL 1860382, at *9 (D. Conn. Apr. 6, 2001) (plaintiffs claimed that franchisor's exclusive
arrangement with vendor amounted to lock-in); Exxon Corp. v. Super. Ct., 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 195,
204 (Ct. App. 1997) (plaintiffs claimed that franchisor's lease requiring them to use only
franchisor's brand of gasoline in the leased tanks locked them in and was thus an illegal tying
arrangement); see also Lin, supra note 1, at 96-99 (discussing other post-Kodak lock-in cases).
15. E g., PSI Repair Servs., Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 104 F.3d 811, 820 (6th Cir. 1997)
(finding "lock-in" theory inapplicable because pre-contract disclosure occurred); Digital Equip.
Corp. v. Uniq Digital Techs., Inc., 73 F.3d 756, 763 (7th Cir. 1996); Allen-Myland, Inc. v. IBM
Corp., 33 F.3d 194, 211 (3d Cir. 1994) (vacating verdict and remanding for reconsideration in
light of the Kodak "lock-in" theory); Virtual Maint., Inc. v. Prime Computer, Inc., 11 F.3d 660,
667 (6th Cir. 1993) (reversing the verdict and remanding for reconsideration in light of the Kodak
decision); Subsolutions, 2001 WL 1860382, at *11 (rejecting plaintiffs' Kodak-type lock-in theory
for lack of evidence of "supra-competitive prices-the sine qua non of a 'lock-in' claim"); Exxon,
60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 204 (denying plaintiffs' Kodak-type lock-in claim since for tying purposes
market power must be judged at the pre-contract stage, before any lock-in had arisen).
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posture-somewhat ambiguous, as later sharp divisions in the literature and
case law reveal.16 It is thus wise to look carefully at Kodak.
After independent service organizations ("ISO"s) began to service
copiers that Kodak manufactured, Kodak instituted policies that made it
more difficult for ISOs to obtain replacement parts and, consequently, to
service Kodak machines.' 7 The ISOs sued, alleging that Kodak tied the sale
of parts and service and monopolized the parts and service aftermarket. "
Kodak prevailed on its summary-judgment argument that-because it
lacked power in the foremarkets (i.e., copiers and other equipment)-it
could not have power in the derivative aftermarkets for parts and services.
The appellate court reversed,2 o and the case arrived at the Supreme Court
with the issues framed in the context of whether Kodak had proven its case
as a matter of law. 2 1 The Supreme Court approached the factual scenario
from two different legal directions:2 2 tying under section I of the Sherman
Act 23 and monopolization under section 2 of the Sherman Act.24
A. Tying Under Kodak
To state a tying claim, the ISOs needed to show "that service and parts
are two distinct products" and "that [the defendant] has tied the sale of the
two products." 2 5  "For service and parts to be considered two distinct
products, there must be sufficient consumer demand so that it is efficient for
16. See, e.g., McDavid & Steuer, supra note 1, at 223-41 (discussing the divisions in case
law after Kodak); Lin, supra note 1, at 88 ("The courts that have addressed [Kodak] have come to
conflicting conclusions."); see also discussion infra Parts 1l.C, II.D.
17. Kodak, 504 U.S. at 455, 458.
18. Id at 459. The District Court did not actually pass on the tying question presented to the
Supreme Court; rather, it determined that there could be no tie between equipment and service.
Id.; Image Technical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., No. C-87-1686-WWS, 1988 WL 156332,
at *2 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 18, 1988), rev'd, 903 F.2d 612 (9th Cir. 1990).
19. Kodak, 504 U.S. at 459.
20. Image Technical Serv., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 903 F.2d 612, 621 (9th Cir. 1990).
21. Kodak, 504 U.S. at454-55.
22. Id. at 462.
23. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006) ("Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is
declared to be illegal.").
24. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2006) ("Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or
combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony. .
25. Kodak, 504 U.S. at 462.
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a firm to provide service separately from parts." 2 6  The ISOs offered
evidence showing this to be the case.27 In support of the existence of a tie,
the ISOs offered evidence that, for instance, Kodak "would sell parts to
third parties only if they agreed not to buy service from ISO's." 28
Having found sufficient evidence of a tying arrangement, the Court
next considered "the other necessary feature of an illegal tying
arrangement[,] appreciable economic power in the tying market." 2 9 In a
common definition, "[m]arket power is the power 'to force a purchaser to
do something that he would not do in a competitive market." 3 0 The ISOs
presented evidence that Kodak had power in the parts market sufficient to
force the purchase of unwanted (and supracompetitively priced) service.'
Kodak countered that although it had a large share of the parts market, it
had no power in that market because it lacked power in the equipment
market.32 Simply put, Kodak argued that it could never have power in the
parts market because it would lose sales in the equipment market if it
charged supracompetitive prices in the parts market.
Kodak offered this argument as a matter of law-i.e., it tendered no
evidence that its argument squared with economic reality.3 4 This lack of
evidence afforded the ISOs an opportunity to offer "a forceful reason why
Kodak's theory, although perhaps intuitively appealing, may not accurately
explain the behavior of the primary and derivative markets for complex
durable goods: the existence of significant information and switching
costs." 35 In this connection, the Court noted that many purchasers do not
"lifecycle" price (i.e., calculate the total cost of a durable good over its
expected life) and that others-including Government purchasers-"often
treat service as an operating expense and equipment as a capital expense,"
with each assigned to a different department.36 In a second, yet related
observation, the Court found that "if the cost of switching is high,
consumers who already have purchased the equipment, and are thus
'locked-in,' will tolerate some level of service-price increases before
26. Id.
27. Id. at 462-63.
28. Id. at 463.
29. Id. at 464.
30. Id. (quoting Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 14 (1984)).
31. Kodak, 504 U.S. at 464-65.
32. Id. at 465.
33. Id at 465-66.
34. Id. at 466-67.
35. Id. at 473.
36. Id. at 475.
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changing equipment brands." 7 Against this backdrop-and in the absence
of any contrary evidence-the Court concluded that there was "a question
of fact whether information costs and switching costs foil the simple
assumption that the equipment and service markets act as pure
complements to one another."3  This, therefore, defeated Kodak's sole
legal defense to the ISO's tying claim.
B. Monopolization Under Kodak
The ISOs also claimed that Kodak monopolized or attempted to
monopolize the service and parts markets.39 "The offense of monopoly
under § 2 of the Sherman Act has two elements: (1) the possession of
monopoly power in the relevant market and (2) the willful acquisition or
maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth or development as
a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic
accident."40 The Court had no trouble finding that there was a triable issue
as to whether Kodak had monopoly power, based on evidence that it
controlled "nearly 100% of the parts market and 80% to 95% of the service
market, with no readily available substitutes."' Kodak's principal
defense-viz., that "a single brand of a product or service can never be a
relevant market under the Sherman Act"4 2-found no traction: "[B]ecause
service and parts for Kodak equipment are not interchangeable with other
manufacturers' service and parts, the relevant market from the Kodak
equipment owner's perspective is comprised of only those companies that
service Kodak machines." 3
The second element of a monopolization claim gave the Court no
greater pause than did the first-again, given the summary judgment
posture of the case. In other words, the Court found that-absent valid
business justifications-the ISOs could escape summary judgment because
they "presented evidence that Kodak took exclusionary action to maintain
its parts monopoly and used its control over parts to strengthen its
monopoly share of the Kodak service market.""
37. Kodak, 504 U.S. at 476.
38. Id. at 477.
39. Id. at 480-81.
40. Id. at 481 (quoting United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966)).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Kodak, 504 U.S. at 482.
44. Id at 483.
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The Court closed with the admonishment that "Kodak's arguments
may prove to be correct." 45 The Court's closing point merely was, then,
that the record was too thin to entitle Kodak to summary judgment. This
has left post-Kodak litigants with theoretical pronouncements that there is
such a creature as a "lock-in" tie and that aftermarkets can be separate from
foremarkets for monopolization purposes, but with little or no guidance as
to how one must plead and prove these violations.4 6 Understandably, courts
down the road have taken many twists and turns, with some courts
appearing to throw up their hands and essentially limit Kodak to its facts.47
We now move to a consideration of more recent cases, first Kodak itself, on
remand, and second, the most significant post-Kodak decisions.
C. Post-Kodak Litigation
1. Kodak II
On remand, the Kodak plaintiffs prevailed at trial and largely preserved
their $72 million jury verdict on appeal.48 Before closing arguments, the
ISOs withdrew their section 1 tying claim. 49 They then proceeded on only a
section 2 monopolization/attempt theory.50 On appeal to the Ninth Circuit,
Kodak raised a host of objections, most of which resolved into two
categories relevant to the present discussion: (1) objections to the market
power instructions and evidence, including objections to the "exercise" of
monopoly power instructions and evidence; and (2) business justifications,
including invocation of IP rights."
45. Id. at 486.
46. See, e.g., Harrison Aire, Inc. v. Aerostar Int'l, Inc., 423 F.3d 374, 381-84 (3d Cir. 2005)
(discussing the aftermarket analysis in Kodak); SMS Sys. Maint. Servs., Inc. v. Digital Equip.
Corp., 188 F.3d 11, 16-18 (1st Cir. 1999) (interpreting the relevance of the foremarkets and
aftermarkets in Kodak); see also Daniel M. Wall, Afternarket Monopoly Five Years After Kodak,
11 ANTITRUST 32, 32 (Summer 1997) (discussing "the mixed signals of language and holding" in
Kodak regarding the issue of aftermarket power).
47. See, e.g., Harrison Aire, 423 F.3d at 382 ("To create a triable question of aftermarket
monopoly power, the plaintiff must produce 'hard evidence dissociating the competitive situation
in the aftermarket from activities occurring in the primary market."' (quoting SMS Sys. Maint.
Servs., 188 F.3d at 17)); Xerox Corp. v. Media Scis., Inc., 660 F. Supp. 2d 535, 545 (S.D.N.Y.
2009).
48. Image Technical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co. (Kodak l1), 125 F.3d 1195, 1200 (9th
Cir. 1997).
49. Id. at 1201.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 1202-11, 1214-20.
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The Ninth Circuit turned back the "power" objections with a
combination of legal arguments set forth in Kodak and evidence developed
at trial (e.g., that an "aggregate" of all parts-not each part-constituted a
market).5 2 With respect to the "use" of that power, Kodak's principal
complaints were that the ISOs had relied on a "leveraging" theory that the
Ninth Circuit had itself previously rejected and that the ISOs were required
to prove their monopolization claim under the "essential facilities" doctrine,
something that they had not done. The court flatly rejected those
arguments before turning to the issue that it-and many subsequent
courts-have found most troubling: namely, the interplay between IP rights
and antitrust liability. 54
Kodak argued that the district court failed to instruct the jury that its
numerous patents and copyrights provided a legitimate business
justification for its alleged exclusionary conduct.55  As the Ninth Circuit
stated the issue, "[W]e must determine the significance of a monopolist's
unilateral refusal to sell or license a patented product or copyrighted
product in the context of a § 2 monopolization claim based on monopoly
leveraging."5 6 The fundamental problem for the ISOs was, then, "the right
of a patent or copyright holder to refuse to sell or license protected work."5 7
The Ninth Circuit began its analysis with Kodak's footnote twenty-nine
and found that "the Court's statement that 'exploit[ing] [a] dominant
position in one market to expand the empire into the next' is broad enough
to cover monopoly leveraging under § 2."5 But-according to the Ninth
Circuit-footnote twenty-nine did not answer the question presented in
Kodak II because the Supreme Court did not specifically address the
antitrust implications of a unilateral refusal to deal in a patented or
copyrighted product.59 Thus, the issue morphed into one focused on the
52. Id. at 1204-06.
53. Id at 1208-11.
54. KodakI, 125 F.3d at 1212-13.
55. Id at 1214.
56. Id
57. Id at 1215.
58. Id at 1216 (quoting Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451,
479 n.29 (1992) (alterations in original)). Footnote twenty-nine addressed the section 1 claim and
the dissent's argument that since Kodak's monopoly was only "inherent," antitrust laws do not
apply to its efforts to move into other markets. Kodak, 504 U.S. at 479 n.29. Rather, the majority
argued that such a "proposal to grant per se immunity to manufacturers competing in the service
market would exempt a vast and growing sector of the economy from antitrust laws" and,
furthermore, has no support in either the "jurisprudence or the evidence in this case." Id.
59. Kodak II, 125 F.3d at 1216.
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nexus between "the definition of the patent grant and the relevant market."60
And the fact that parts and service "have been proven separate markets in
the antitrust context" does not put this issue to rest.6 1 The Ninth Circuit was
especially troubled that it was assessing a section 2 claim, and that,
consequently, it was being asked to attach liability to (potentially
procompetitive) unilateral conduct, which "is the most common conduct in
the economy." 62
To impede the proliferation of claims based on unilateral conduct, the
Ninth Circuit adopted a rebuttable presumption that the exercise of IP rights
is a legitimate business justification insulating the holder from antitrust
liability.6 3  Nonetheless, the court went on to find that Kodak's IP-based
justification was pretextual.6 In reaching this conclusion, the court pointed
to evidence that Kodak employees gave no thought to IP rights when
formulating the parts policy and that the policy applied to all parts,
including unprotected parts.
2. Other Post-Kodak Cases
Based on Kodak J,66 plaintiffs have two possible avenues of redress in a
foremarket-aftermarket case: a tying claim under section I and a
monopolization/attempt to monopolize claim under section 2.67 But despite
60. Id. A patent's grant "is limited to the invention which it defines" and patent and
copyright law determine the relevant market for determining the patent or copyright grant. Id. at
1216-17 (quoting Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661, 666 (1944)). For
antitrust purposes, however, economic conditions determine the relevant markets. Id. (citing
Kodak, 504 U.S. at 462); see also Triad Sys. Corp. v. Se. Express Co., 64 F.3d 1330, 1338 (9th
Cir. 1995) (noting the distinction between copyright market definition and antitrust market
definition), overruled on other grounds by Gonzales v. Texaco Inc., No. 07-17123, 2009 U.S.
App. LEXIS 18370, at *5 (9th Cir. Aug. 17, 2009).
61. Kodak II, 125 F.3d at 1217; see also id. at 1203 ("[In Kodak, the Supreme] Court held
that service and parts could constitute separate markets.").
62. Id.
63. Id. at 1218. The addition of the rebuttable presumption is significant, since, as the court
notes, "[u]nder current law the defense of monopolization claims will rest largely on the
legitimacy of the asserted business justifications." Id. at 1217-18 (referring to the jury instructions
for section 2 claims endorsed by the Supreme Court in Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands
Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 596-97 (1985)).
64. Id. at 1219 ("Neither the aims of intellectual property law, nor the antitrust laws justify
allowing a monopolist to rely upon a pretextual business justification to mask anticompetitive
conduct." (citation omitted)).
65. Id.
66. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992).
67. For example, in an early and influential post-Kodak case, Queen City Pizza, Inc. v.
Domino's Pizza, Inc., 124 F.3d 430, 434-35 (3d Cir. 1997), plaintiffs alleged foremarket and
256 [Vol. 40
2010] LEGACY OF KODAK AND QUEEN CITY PIZZA
the success of the plaintiffs in Kodak II, neither theory has fared well in the
federal courts, although there are a few notable exceptions.68  Many of the
failures are attributable to allegations that don't remotely fit within the
Kodak rubric.69 Yet other cases, at least facially, do fit within the rubric
and, therefore, warrant some notice.
Part of the problem with Kodak is that it is very difficult to tell exactly
which of its points is of greatest significance. There is general agreement
that the uniqueness of aftermarket goods and the presence of switching and
information costs are necessary to establish an aftermarket as the "relevant
market" for antitrust purposes.70 But a number of cases hold that these
factors are not alone sufficient to state a claim. 7 1 The most common
reasoning is that a Kodak-type claim will not succeed absent a showing that
the "defendant has actually changed its policy after locking-in some of its
customers."72
aftermarket claims under section 1 and section 2 in addition to state law tort and contract claims.
The case is discussed in detail below. See discussion infra Part III.B.
68. E.g., In re Apple & AT & TM Antitrust Litigation, 596 F. Supp. 2d 1288, 1305-06 (N.D.
Cal. 2008) (finding that, even though the aftermarket was contractually created, there are disputed
facts as to whether defendants locked in consumers such that "[p]laintiffs have sufficiently alleged
market power and monopolization in the iPhone voice and data services aftermarket ... to state a
claim for violation of § 2 of the Sherman Act"); Red Lion Med. Safety, Inc. v. Ohmeda, Inc., 63 F.
Supp. 2d 1218, 1232 (E.D. Cal. 1999); Collins v. Int'l Dairy Queen, Inc., 980 F. Supp. 1252,
1260-61 (M.D. Ga. 1997).
69. See, e.g., Commercial Data Servers, Inc. v. IBM Corp., 262 F. Supp. 2d 50, 67 (S.D.N.Y.
2003) (finding that the plaintiff failed to present evidence of Kodak lock-in, e.g., high switching
costs, high information costs, and an ability to exploit "ignorant" customers).
70. See, e.g., Newcal Indus., Inc. v. Ikon Office Solution, 513 F.3d 1038, 1048-51 (9th Cir.
2008) (analyzing an aftermarket as the "relevant market" under the Kodak line of cases using
essential criteria such as information and switching costs and uniqueness). Similarly, in SMS
Maint. Servs., Inc. v. Digital Equip. Corp., 188 F.3d 11, 16-18 (1st Cir. 1999), the court ruled that
"[A] litigant who envisions the aftermarket as the relevant market must advance hard evidence
dissociating the competitive situation in the aftermarket from activities occurring in the primary
market," including the role of product uniqueness and of switching costs.
71. E.g., Xerox Corp. v. Media Sci., Inc., 660 F. Supp. 2d 535, 549-50 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)
(dismissing antitrust claims against copier manufacturer because there was insufficient evidence
that the copier manufacturer "possess[ed] monopoly power in the market for ink sticks for its
color workgroup printers" since "additional factors are relevant in the aftermarket context");
Queen City Pizza, 129 F.3d at 439 ("Kodak does not hold that the existence of information and
switching costs alone .. .renders an otherwise invalid relevant market valid.").
72. ID Sec. Sys. Can., Inc. v. Checkpoint Sys., Inc., 249 F. Supp. 2d 622, 642 (E.D. Pa.
2003); see also Harrison Aire, Inc. v. Aerostar Int'l, Inc., 423 F.3d 374, 383-85 (3d Cir. 2005)
(discussing the effects of "aftermarket policy change" in relation to Kodak claims and finding that
since defendant's aftermarket policy was "transparent and known" to the defendant during the
primary market, summary judgment was proper); SMS Maint. Servs., 188 F.3d at 19
(distinguishing Kodak because that case involved "a retroactive change in the rules because many
customers had purchased Kodak machines against a background understanding that they would be
able to procure parts from ISOs"); Alcatel USA, Inc. v. DGI Techs., Inc., 166 F.3d 772, 783 (5th
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Against this weight of authority, there is some-though slight-
counterweight, some of which is well reasoned. For instance, in Red Lion
Medical Safety, Inc. v. Ohmeda, Inc., the court specifically found that:
Kodak I does not hold that an aftermarket claim is contingent on a change
in a manufacturer's parts or service policy; it simply acknowledges that
Kodak's ability to make a policy change without suffering losses in the
equipment market was evidence that the service market was not
disciplined by competition in the equipment market. 7
In other words, "the policy change did not create lock-in; instead, the
existence of lock-in-high switching costs-made it both possible and
economically desirable for Kodak to change its policy and exploit
aftermarket consumers."74 By these lights, the majority line of cases has
Kodak backwards because "the policy change did not create monopoly
power; it was merely persuasive evidence that Kodak had market power in
parts and engaged in monopolistic conduct in the aftermarket despite
competition in the equipment market."7  Rather, "[t]o insist on a showing
of policy change confuses a symptom of market power and a lack of cross
elasticity with the underlying condition itself."76
Cir. 1999) ( "Several circuits have held ... a change in policy is a crucial factor in establishing an
aftermarket monopoly claim."); PSI Repair Servs., Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 104 F.3d 811, 819 (6th
Cir. 1997) ("[Tjhe change in policy in Kodak was the crucial factor in the Court's decision.");
Digital Equip. Corp. v. Unique Digital Techs., Inc., 73 F.3d 756, 763 (7th Cir. 1996) ("The
material dispute that called for trial was whether the change in policy enabled Kodak to extract
supra-competitive prices from customers who had already purchased its machines."); Apple, Inc.
v. Psystar Corp., 586 F. Supp. 2d 1190, 1200-03 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (finding that dismissal of the
defendant's Kodak claim was warranted because the aftermarket for computer operating systems
was contractually created by the End User License Agreement, which users would have known
limited them to using their Mac operating systems only on Apple computers); Avaya, Inc. v.
Telecom Labs, Inc., No. 06-2490, 2008 WL 4117957, at *12-13 (D.N.J. Aug. 29, 2008) (finding
that the counterclaim alleged a relevant market where the defendant "made changes to its policies
regarding [software] usage so as to make it cost prohibitive for the [plaintiff| system owners to use
an ISP in this manner, [the defendant] was making a policy change that targeted the 'locked-in'
[plaintiff] system owners and thereby violated the antitrust laws"); Metzler v. Bear Auto. Serv.
Equip. Co., 19 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1359 (S.D. Fla. 1998) ("[P]laintiffs have failed to produce
sufficient evidence to permit a reasonable jury to find that the defendants used a change in policy
to exact supracompetitive prices from existing customers.").
73. 63 F. Supp. 2d 1218, 1230 (E.D. Cal. 1999).
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id Courts use the concept of cross-elasticity to measure demand and determine whether
goods are interchangeable and, thus, are adequate substitutes for one another in the market. See
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 469 (1992) (defining "cross-
elasticity of demand" and stating that "[t]he extent to which one market prevents exploitation of
another market depends on the extent to which consumers will change their consumption of one
product in response to a price change in another. . .").
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Another Kodak issue arises when a defendant refuses to sell parts to an
aftermarket competitor. The refusal-to-deal aspect of this scenario is one to
which Kodak itself gave little consideration, treating it in an enigmatic
footnote: "It is true that as a general matter a firm can refuse to deal with its
competitors. But such a right is not absolute; it exists only if there are
legitimate competitive reasons for the refusal." 77 Plainly, this leaves open
the question whether, for example, a competitor can refuse to sell parts to
an aftermarket competitor, if that leads to monopolization of the services
market as well. The leading case on the subject, In re Independent Service
Organizations Antitrust Litigation ("ISO"), teaches that it is not a violation,
at least if the parts are protected by patents or copyrights.
ISO is-as the case-name suggests-factually and legally similar to
Kodak. The principal conduct at issue was Xerox's "refusal to sell patented
parts and copyrighted manuals and to license copyrighted software ....
To support its argument that Xerox illegally sought to leverage its
legitimate (by virtue of intellectual property rights) dominance in the
equipment and parts market into dominance in the service market, the
appellant ISO relied on one of the Kodak footnotes: i.e., "[t]he Court has
held many times that power gained through some natural and legal
advantage such as a patent,.. . can give rise to liability if 'a seller exploits
his dominant position in one market to expand his empire into the next."' 80
The ISO Court deemed the Kodak footnote irrelevant, for two reasons.
First, the footnote appears in connection with the tying claim, a claim not at
issue in ISO." Second, "the cited language from Kodak does nothing to
limit the right of the patentee to refuse to sell or license in markets within
the scope of the statutory patent grant." 82 In fact, the court noted that it has
"expressly held that, absent exceptional circumstances, a patent may confer
the right to exclude competition altogether in more than one antitrust
market.", 3 Given this legal precedent, the court explicitly held that Xerox
did not violate the antitrust laws by refusing to sell parts to ISOs. 8 4 The
77. Kodak, 504 U.S. at 483 n.32.
78. 203 F.3d 1322, 1328-29 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
79. Id at 1324.
80. Id. at 1326-27 (quoting Kodak, 504 U.S. at 480 n.29).
81. Id. at 1327.
82. See id.
83. Id. (citing B. Braun Med., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 124 F.3d 1419, 1427 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 1997)
(finding that the patentee had the right to exclude competition in both the market for patented
valves and the market for extension sets incorporating those patented valves)).
84. In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d at 1328 ("Xerox was under no
obligation to sell or license its patented parts and did not violate the antitrust laws by refusing to
do so.").
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court thereby implicitly held (and it is interesting that the court did not
make the statement) that Xerox could refuse to sell parts, even if this meant
that, as a consequence, it monopolized the collateral service market.85 The
court then went on to reach a similar holding with respect to the
copyrighted materials at issue.86
D. Kodak in the Franchise Context
As noted at the outset, Kodak claims have a very poor record of
success.87  In fact, not many claims of this type have survived summary
judgment since Kodak I.J8  Some of this is a function of ambiguities in
Kodak itself; the remainder is attributable to the Supreme Court's
narrowing of the definition of exclusionary conduct, coupled with a general
suspicion of tying, leveraging, and essential facilities theories.89  In any
85. See id. at 1327-28.
86. See id. at 1328-29. In reaching this decision, the court adopted the standard formulated by
the First Circuit that "while exclusionary conduct can include a monopolist's unilateral refusal to
license a copyright, an author's desire to exclude others from use of its copyrighted work is a
presumptively valid business justification for any immediate harm to consumers." Id. (citing Data
Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147 (1st Cir. 1994), abrogated on other
grounds by Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 130 S. Ct. 1237, 1243 (2010).
Other courts have continued to add interesting wrinkles to the body of law. For example,
the Eleventh Circuit's leading post-Kodak decision is Telecom Technical Services, Inc. v. Rolm
Co., 388 F.3d 820 (11th Cir. 2004). The case arose out of the defendants' refusal to sell parts to
ISOs. The ISOs claimed that this conduct constituted a violation of section 2, in that it permitted
the defendants to monopolize the service market. Rolm, 388 F.3d at 824-25. On appeal, the
principal issue with respect to parts was whether the defendants could effectively assert IP rights
as a defense to the refusal to deal. See id. at 826. The case thus, at least initially, invited the court
to navigate a course towards, away from, or in between ISO and Kodak II. But it did neither, for
reasons that could prove decisive in many cases.
True enough, the Rolm defendants had refused to sell parts to ISOs. But the prohibition
was not absolute because the defendants permitted an equipment owner to order parts for
installation by an ISO or to "provide an ISO with a letter of agency such that the ISO may order
the part . .. and carry out the installation . . . ." Id. at 827. In this circumstance, the court held,
"there is not actionable harm to consumers and therefore the ISOs have failed to prove a violation
of § 2 of the Sherman Act with respect to the parts policy." Id. at 827-28.
87. See McDavid & Steuer, supra note 1, at 226-31; Lin, supra note 1, at 88 (discussing
cases of successful and unsuccessful Kodak claims).
88. See, e.g., Storage Tech. Corp. v. Custom Hardware Eng'g & Consulting, Ltd., No. 02-
12102-RWZ, 2006 WL 1766434, at *30 (D. Mass. June 28, 2006) (denying defendant's summary
judgment on plaintiffs' section I claim since "[a] reasonable jury might conclude from this
evidence that this case falls more within the ambit of Kodak rather than SMS, and that the relevant
market is properly defined as the service aftermarket rather than the equipment foremarket").
89. See Pacific Bell Tel. Co. v. LinkLine Commc'ns, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1109, 1121-22 (2009)
(dismissing a proposed "transfer price test" for presuming a price squeeze by upstream
monopolists and noting that "antitrust law does not forbid lawfully obtained monopolies from
260 [Vol. 40
2010] LEGACY OF KODAK AND QUEEN CITY PIZZA
event, franchise relationships have added a number of wrinkles to the
Kodak fabric, each of which becomes apparent upon a review of the cases.
Franchisees typically attack restrictions on their ability to deal in products
purchased from third parties (i.e., from a party other than their franchisor)
under just a few antitrust theories (as already indicated, other theories of
recovery-like breach of contract-are often alleged as well), most
commonly improper exclusive dealing and tying. We will examine the
historical development of each of these theories in turn.
1. Do Contractual Restrictions on Product Purchases from Third-
Party Vendors Constitute an Unreasonable Restraint of Trade?
Exclusive dealing is not unique to the franchise context.90 Most
generally, exclusive dealing occurs when a supplier and its dealer have an
agreement under which the dealer will handle only the products of the
supplier or, alternatively, that the dealer will not handle products that
compete with those of the supplier.91 This type of arrangement is a non-
price, vertical restraint (i.e., between parties at different levels in a
distribution chain) 92 and, as such, is evaluated under the rule of reason (i.e.,
it will be condemned only if the economic disadvantages of the
arrangement outweigh its economic advantages). Plaintiffs usually mount
charging monopoly prices"); Ill. Tool Works, Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 42-43 (2005)
(abrogating the tying per se rule that presumed a relevant market when a patent was involved and
instead requiring the plaintiff to prove power in the relevant market); Verizon Commc'ns, Inc. v.
Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 414 (2004) (remarking that "applying the requirements of § 2 'can be
difficult' because 'the means of illicit exclusion, like the means of legitimate competition, are
myriad"' and, consequently, "[m]istaken inferences and the resulting false condemnations are
especially costly, because they chill the very conduct the antitrust laws are designed to protect")
(citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 594 (1986)).
90. It is, for example, frequently used in distributorships. See 2 THEODORE L. BANKS,
DISTRIBUTION LAW: ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE § 5.01 (2d ed. Supp. 2009).
91. See, e.g., Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 2 (1984) (exclusive
contract between hospital and anesthesiologists); Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S.
320, 320 (1961) (exclusive agreement between electric utility provider and coal company); see
also BANKS, supra note 90, § 5.01.
92. E.g., Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. G.T. Britts Distrib., Inc., 44 F. Supp. 2d. 172, 175-76
(N.D.N.Y. 1999) ("Agreements with manufacturers that limit distributors' sales to products made
by the manufacturer are not per se violations of antitrust laws.").
93. Courts use the rule of reason test to determine whether a non-price vertical restraint
violates antitrust law principles. 2 GARNER, supra note 5, § 11:16. As one commentator notes,
the test involves four elements the plaintiff must show: "that the defendant contracted, combined,
or conspired, that the contract produced adverse anticompetitive effects within the relevant
product and geographic markets, and that the objects of conduct resulting from the contract were
illegal and that the contract was the proximate cause of the plaintiffs injury." Id. § 11:9; see also
Nw. Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery and Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 297 (1985)
261
SOUTHWESTERN LAW REVIEW
an attack under section 1 of the Sherman Act (which prohibits agreements
in restraint of trade),94 section 3 of the Clayton Act (which prohibits certain
exclusive dealing practices), 95 or-less frequently until very recently-
section 2 of the Sherman Act (which prohibits certain monopolies and
-96attempts to monopolize).
Challenges to exclusive dealing arrangements are rarely successful,
especially in the context of franchises. This is so because courts in recent
years have been quick to accept arguments that intrabrand exclusivity can
promote interbrand competition by, for example, focusing sales and
marketing efforts on franchised products. And because courts are
reluctant to recognize single-brand monopolies, section 2 exclusivity claims
are difficult to sustain in a market filled with substitute products.99 This is
to be distinguished from a situation in which a supplier holds an extremely
high market share (perhaps 75% or so) and its exclusive dealing agreements
effectively deny market access to its competitors. 00 Finally, many courts
read prohibitions against exclusive dealing quite literally. For example, an
arrangement that is not absolutely exclusive is not subject to review under
the Sherman or Clayton Acts as an improper "exclusive dealing"
agreement.0o Given these difficulties, plaintiffs have all but abandoned
(noting that the rule of reason is the appropriate test over the per se test for vertical restraint
issues).
94. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). See, e.g., Hesco Parts, LLC v. Ford Motor Co., No. 3:02CV-
736-S, 2006 WL 2734429, at *1 (W.D. Ky. Sept. 22, 2006) (section 1).
95. See 15 U.S.C. § 14. See, e.g., Tampa Elec., 365 U.S. at 321 (section 3 of the Clayton
Act).
96. See 15 U.S.C. § 1. See e.g., Hodge v. Vills. of Homestead Homeowners Ass'n, Inc., 726
F. Supp. 297, 298 (S.D. Fla. 1989) (section 2 of the Sherman Act); see also 2 BANKS, supra note
90, § 5.02 (discussing the statutes and cases dealing with excusive dealing arrangements).
97. See, e.g., Capital Temporaries, Inc. v. Olsten Corp., 506 F.2d 658, 666-67 (2d Cir. 1974)
(holding that restrictive covenant to enter into "blue collar business" with no evidence of coercion
does not amount to exclusive dealing); Joyce Beverages of New York, Inc. v. Royal Crown Cola
Co., 555 F. Supp. 271, 279 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (finding no exclusive dealing under "exclusive
efforts" provision prohibiting plaintiff from distributing similar sodas because agreement fostered
intrabrand competition).
98. See, e.g., In re Super Premium Iee Cream Distrib. Antitrust Litig., 691 F. Supp. 1262,
1267 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (holding that termination of dealer for violating exclusivity arrangement
did not injure competition: "Separate distribution has led to increased and successful interbrand
competition"), af'd sub nom. Haagen-Dazs Co., Inc. v. Double Rainbow Gourmet Ice Creams,
Inc., 920 F.2d 587 (9th Cir. 1990).
99. See id. at 1268-69; see also 2 BANKS, supra note 90, § 7.03[D] (providing a table of
cases giving the percentage of market share and the relative outcome for each).
100. See United States v. Dentsply Int'l, Inc., 399 F.3d 181, 184-86, 190 (3d Cir. 2005).
101. See Stearns v. Genrad, Inc., 752 F.2d 942, 945-46 (4th Cir. 1984) (holding that distributor
could not state a claim of exclusive dealing against a manufacturer under section 1 of the Sherman
Act based on their distribution agreement because the distributor had had extensive dealings with
another manufacturer); Valin Corp. v. Ametek, Inc., No. C-85-200001-WAI, 1986 WL 961, at *2
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exclusive dealing as a theory of recovery in franchise aftermarket litigation,
at least when the complaint is one involving purchases of ingredients and
supplies.
2. Do Contractual Restrictions on Third-Party Purchases, When
Coupled with Its Requirement That Franchisees Purchase Certain
Products from the Franchisor, Constitute Improper Tying?-
Historical Approaches10 2
Franchise systems by their nature depend on the bundling of products
and services. 103 For example, most franchise packages include products,
trademarks, store designs, real estate, supplies and/or equipment.1'" With
varying success, plaintiffs have attacked these packages as unlawful tying
arrangements under the antitrust laws. 05
As already noted, a tying arrangement exists when a seller conditions
the sale of one product (the tying product) on the purchase of a separate
product or service (the tied product or service). 06  Tying can be illegal
under section 1 of the Sherman Act, section 5 of the FTC Act (for which
(N.D. Cal. Apr. 2, 1986) (noting that although the manufacturer did not favor distributors having
competing lines, it had no policy of threatening or terminating distributors for doing so); Perington
Wholesale, Inc. v. Burger King Corp., 554 F. Supp. 708, 714 (D. Colo. 1982) (noting that
franchisee purchases from alternative sources indicated that distributorship was non-exclusive).
In a related vein, several states (including but not limited to Hawaii, Indiana, Iowa, Washington,
and the District of Columbia) have provisions in their franchise laws that prohibit certain
restrictions on a franchisee's sources of supply. I have not analyzed these statutes here, but a
franchisor would be well advised to do so before placing aftermarket source restrictions on its
franchisees.
102. This historical section loosely follows Chapter 7 of Banks' treatise, DISTRIBUTION LAW,
which fairly represents various tacks that courts took to franchise relationships in the pre-Kodak
era. See 2 BANKS, supra note 90, § 7.01-11.
103. See Rick-Mik Enters., Inc. v. Equilon Enters., LLC, 532 F.3d 963, 974 (9th Cir. 2008)
("Franchises, almost by definition, necessarily consist of 'bundled' and related products or
services-not separate products.").
104. See Kappas v. United States, 578 F. Supp. 1435, 1438 (C.D. Cal. 1983).
105. E.g., Photovest Corp. v. Fotomat Corp., 606 F.2d 704, 724-25 (9th Cir. 1979) (holding
that requirement for franchisees to lease kiosks from the franchisor was an illegal tie-in); Northern
v. McGraw-Edison Co., 542 F.2d 1336, 1345 (8th Cir. 1976) (holding that franchisor license of its
trademarks to dealer-agents who then assembled complete dry cleaning operations and leased
them as "going businesses" to franchisees was an illegal tie-in); Carpa, Inc. v. Ward Foods, Inc.,
536 F.2d 39, 46-47 (5th Cir. 1976) (holding that franchisor's required lease of completed
restaurant to franchisee was illegal tie-in).
106. See, e.g., Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 461 (1992)
("A tying arrangement is 'an agreement by a party to sell one product but only on the condition
that the buyer also purchases a different (or tied) product, or at least agrees that he will not
purchase that product from any other supplier."' (citing N. Pacific Ry. Co. v. United States, 356
U.S. 1, 5-6 (1958)).
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there is no private cause of action), 07 section 3 of the Clayton Act (where
tying is the method of ensuring exclusive dealing), and section 2 of the
Sherman Act (where tying is used as a tool for monopolizing). 08 For many
years, tying was considered per se illegal;' 09 in recent years, however,
courts have increasingly taken a broad economic approach and considered
not only market power but a range of potentially pro-competitive
justifications such as production and marketing efficiencies, quality control,
and indirect price competition." 0
In the franchise context, franchisees typically frame a tying claim
around an allegation that their franchisor has tied the sale of goods to the
purchase of the right to use a trademark."' To facilitate an analysis of this
type of claim, courts and commentators have created separate rubrics for
evaluating franchises according to the type of franchise involved:" 2
Business Format Franchise. In a business format franchise, the
franchisor licenses a method of operating a business. Tying allegations
arise when the franchisor forces its franchisee to purchase items that are not
related to the trademark license (e.g., a fast food franchisor requires its
franchisees to purchase generic paper cups from it).
Distribution System Franchise. In a distribution system franchise, the
primary purpose of the franchise is the sale of specific trademarked
products. Tying disputes arise when the franchisor prohibits the sale of
products other than its own.
Package Franchise. In a package franchise, each component (e.g.,
trademark, real estate lease and products) is designed to further the success
of the business. In some ways, this type of franchise is simply a refined and
elaborated "business format" franchise, with an overlay of characteristics of
a "distribution system" franchise.
107. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2006) ("Unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and
unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are hereby declared unlawful.").
108. 2 BANKS, supra note 90, § 7.02.
109. See, e.g., Fortner Enters. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 503 (1969) ("[T]ying
arrangements generally serve no legitimate business purpose that cannot be achieved in some less
restrictive way."). The elements of a per se actionable tying claim are: (1) two separate products;
(2) a sale conditioned on purchase of both products; (3) market power in the tied product; (4) a
sufficient impact on interstate commerce. See N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-6
(1958); see also Town Sound & Custom Tops, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 959 F.2d 468, 477
(3d Cir. 1992).
110. See Kodak, 504 U.S. at 451, 461; Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2,
33-42 (1984) (O'Connnor, J., concurring), superseded by statute, 35 U.S.C §271(d)(5) as stated in
Ill. Tool Works, Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 41-46 (2006); Town Sound & Custom Tops,
Inc., 959 F.2d at 477-78.
111. E.g., Queen City Pizza, Inc. v. Domino's Pizza, Inc.,124 F.3d 430, 433-34 (3d Cir. 1997).
112. See 2 BANKS, supra note 90, § 7.10[A]-[C].
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One complication here is that courts developed these varied approaches
based on franchise type prior to the Supreme Court's landmark tying
decision in Jefferson Parish.'" In that case, the Court inquired into the
demand for the services at issue to see if there were services from separate
markets being tied together.1 4 And although the case was not a franchise
case, at least one court has opined that its market-demand test has rendered
franchise-type tests moot."' Other courts disagree, and it seems that
franchise-type distinctions are, for some courts, a fair method of evaluating
product demand and that, therefore, these distinctions are consistent with
the Jefferson Parish approach."16
a. Business Format Franchises
One early-and paradigmatic-case of this type is Siegel v. Chicken
Delight, Inc."' There, Chicken Delight required its franchisees to purchase
certain equipment and packaging from it." 8 The court ultimately held that
this requirement constituted an illegal tie between those products and the
trademark license.119 In reaching its holding, the court voiced a concern
that the defendant was attempting to "extend the trade-mark protection to
common articles (which the public does not and has no reason to connect
with the trade-mark)."l20 In other words, the court was opining that
consumers have no interest in whether their Chicken Delight chicken is
113. 466 U.S. at 2-3.
114. Id. at 39, 43.
115. See Casey v. Diet Ctr., Inc., 590 F. Supp. 1561, 1565-66 (N.D. Cal. 1984)
("Characterizing a particular franchise as business format or distributional does not aid in
weighing the economic benefits that society is acknowledged to derive from franchises against
any potential harm from the tie of component products.").
116. See, e.g., Smith v. Mobil Oil Corp., 667 F. Supp. 1314, 1327 (W.D. Mo. 1987) ("The
court finds it difficult to accept the conclusion that [Jefferson Parish] overruled the whole flock of
[cases using various franchise-type tests] without mentioning even one of them.").
117. 448 F.2d 43, 46-48 (9th Cir. 1971).
118. Id. at 46.
119. Id. at 47-49. In reaching this decision, the court relied in part on theories that "sufficient
economic power is to be presumed where the tying product is patented or copyrighted" and that
trademarks do not extend to the tied product. Id. at 50. Recently, however, the Ninth Circuit has
dismissed these as "old theor[ies]" as "no longer relevant" after the Supreme Court's decision in
Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 31 (2006). Rick-Mik Enterprises, Inc. v.
Equilon Enters., LLC, 532 F.3d 963, 974 n.3 (9th Cir. 2008).
120. Chicken Delight, 448 F.2d at 49; see also Krehl v. Baskin-Robbins Ice Cream Co., 664
F.2d 1348, 1353 (9th Cir. 1982) ("[C]onsumers have no reason to associate with the trademark,
those component goods used either in the operation of the franchised store or in the manufacture
of the end product.").
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fried in a fryer distributed by Chicken Delight or by General Electric, so
long as the end product is the same.121
b. Distribution System Franchises
Some franchises exist solely to sell trademarked products. A common
example is a branded new car dealership. A customer enters this dealership
expecting, for example, to find new cars made only by Ford at a Ford
dealership. In contrast, a customer entering a McDonald's does not expect
that the ingredients in his Big Mac were manufactured by McDonald's;
rather, he expects that the Big Mac conforms to certain quality standards
and is prepared according to a formula. In short, he expects to purchase a
sandwich in Tennessee that is indistinguishable from one purchased in
Texas. The point of contrast between the two types of franchises is thus
readily apparent: when buying from a distribution franchise, consumers
expect that their purchases will be of a certain quality and that those
purchases originated with the trademark owner; when buying from a
business format franchise, consumers' expectations are limited to quality.
If a franchisor can convince a court that its franchisees are essentially
distributors of its products, then it takes only a short step to convince the
court that the trademark has no existence apart from the products it
identifies. For example, in Krehl v. Baskin-Robbins Ice Cream Co., the
court evaluated restrictions on franchisees as to where they obtained ice
cream.122 The court started from the premise that-in a distribution-type
arrangement-the franchise is a conduit through which the trademarked
goods are delivered to consumers: "'It is to the system and the end product
that the public looks with the confidence that the established goodwill has
created."'l 2 3 "Consequently, sale of substandard products under the mark
would dissipate this goodwill and reduce the value of the trademark."l 2 4
The prohibition against tying is aimed at a situation in which purchase of an
unwanted product is compelled.12 5  But in a distribution franchise, the
121. This does not suggest that one must demonstrate consumer perceptions to convince a
court that a franchise system is of one type or another. See, e.g., Smith, 667 F. Supp. at 1325
("[A]s a matter of the substantive law of antitrust-specifically, the law concerning franchise-
trademark tying arrangements-consumer perceptions are immaterial to deciding the nature of a
particular franchise system."). Nonetheless, consumer perceptions are useful in understanding the
evolution of the various franchise types.
122. 664 F.2d 1348, 1352-54 (9th Cir. 1982).
123. Id. at 1354 (quoting Chicken Delight, 448 F.2d at 49).
124. Krehl, 664 F.2d at 1354.
125. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451,452 (1992).
266 [Vol. 40
2010] LEGACY OF KODAK AND QUEEN CITY PIZZA
trademark identifies a product that a franchisee (and its customers) desire.126
Given this inextricable relationship between the mark and the quality of the
product it represents, there is no second, unwanted product to be tied.12 7
The line between distribution and business-format franchises is not
always clear. 12 8 Indeed a franchise that is predominantly of one type may
nonetheless have attributes of the other. For example, as one commentator
has concluded, a business-method franchise may have one or two critical
products that are key to the success of the enterprise and that cannot be
supplied by anyone other than the franchisor, thus mandating that the entire
arrangement be treated as a distribution franchise.12 9
Other courts have held that the business-format/distribution franchise
distinction is unnecessary. 30 In Casey v. Diet Center, Inc., a subfranchisee
alleged that the franchisor illegally tied the purchase of diet supplements to
a trademark.131 The court declined to follow either Chicken Delight or
Baskin-Robbins, finding that neither analytical framework was appropriate
under Jefferson Parish.3 2 Ultimately, the court granted summary judgment
for the defendant because the demand for the diet pills was not separate
from the franchise (the diet pills were available to consumers only from
franchisees). 133 Thus, the court reasoned that treating the diet pills as a
separate market would serve no purpose under the antitrust laws.134 The
court went on to hold that even if the mark and diet pills were separate
products, the tie was not per se illegal absent a showing of market power in
126. See Smith, 667 F. Supp. at 1324 ("[T]he Mobil trademark is not, under the law, separate
from the gasoline it identifies, but the two are one and the same thing, namely, Mobil-branded
gasoline.").
127. Krehl, 664 F.2d at 1354; see also Cal. Glazed Prods., Inc. v. Bums & Russell Co., 708
F.2d 1423, 1430 (9th Cir. 1983) (concluding that the desirability of the franchisor's glazed blocks
was "inextricably interrelated in the consumer's mind in a manner that precludes finding that the
trademark is a separate item for tie-in purposes"). At least one commentator has noted that the
merger of trademark and product in a distribution contract means that exclusive dealing-rather
than tying-analysis is more appropriate. 2 BANKS, supra note 90, § 7. 10[B] & n.3 1.
128. Smith, 667 F. Supp. at 1322 n.8 ("[T]he term 'franchising' covers a wide range of
business relationships, and it seems equally clear that no hard and fast line always may be drawn
between one 'type' of franchising arrangement and another.").
129. See 2 BANKS, supra note 90, § 7.10[B] n.34 (citing KFC Corp. v. Marion-Kay Co., 620
F. Supp. 1160 (S.D. Ind. 1985) (finding that the trademark was not a separate product, but rather
means to identify chicken prepared with secret seasoning).
130. One could argue, however, that the Casey court was simply endorsing the idea of a
"package" franchise, given that it approvingly cited the approach taken in Principe. See Casey,
590 F. Supp. at 1566 n.6.
131. 590 F. Supp. 1561, 1562-63 (N.D. Cal. 1984).
132. Id. at 1565-66.
133. Id. at 1566.
134. Id. at 1567.
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the tying product.'15 And because the trademark carried no presumption of
market power and defendant's share of the overall market was less than
twenty percent, the court found no actionable restraint of trade.136
c. Package Franchises
As demonstrated above, a distribution franchise is characterized by the
conceptual merger of a trademark and the products that it represents. Some
courts have taken this a step further and found that the trademark is
inseparable from the franchise itself. Principe v. McDonald's Corp. is
representative of this line of cases. 13 7 In Principe, the plaintiff alleged an
illegal tie among a franchise, a real estate lease, and a security deposit
note.'38  The case arose against the backdrop of McDonald's business
practice of analyzing potential restaurant sites, developing them, then
leasing them to franchisees.13 9 The plaintiff argued that the terms of the
franchise, lease and the related security deposit were so onerous as to
evidence an illegal tie between all these elements and the trademark.140 But
the court disagreed and held, in essence, that cases like Chicken Delight
were wrongly decided because focusing on a trademark as the crucial
element of a franchise ignores the business realities of modem franchises.141
That is, franchisors do not merely give a trademark license; they offer a
"complete method of doing business." 4 2 Accordingly, the proper inquiry is
whether the allegedly tied products "are integral components of the
business method being franchised." 4 3  The court concluded that a
franchisor may lawfully require a franchisee to purchase products and
services if "the challenged aggregation is an essential ingredient of the
franchised system's formula for success . . . ."'" In some respects, this
standard is an elaboration of that first articulated in the business-method
135. Id. at 1566, 1570.
136. Id. at 1569-70.
137. 631 F.2d 303, 311 (4th Cir. 1980); see also Bender v. Southland Corp., 749 F.2d 1205,
1215 (6th Cir. 1984); Kugler v. AAMCO Automatic Transmissions, Inc., 460 F.2d 1214, 1215-16
(8th Cir. 1972).
138. Principe, 631 F.2d at 304.
139. Id. at 305-07.
140. Id. at 307.
141. Id. at 308-09.
142. Idat 309.
143. Id.
144. Principe, 631 F.2d at 309.
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franchise context.14 5 The difference, it seems, is that the focus is on the
entire package that a franchisee decides either to accept or decline, rather
than on whether a range of products and services are closely related to a
trademark:
Far from merely licensing franchisees to sell products under its trade
name, a modem franchisor such as McDonald's offers its franchisees a
complete method of doing business. It takes people from all walks of life,
sends them to its management school, and teaches them a variety of skills
ranging from hamburger grilling to financial planning. It installs them in
stores whose market has been researched and whose location has been
selected by experts to maximize sales potential. It inspects every facet of
every store several times a year and consults with each franchisee about its
operations strengths and weaknesses .... This pervasive franchisor
supervision and control benefits the franchisee in turn. His business is
identified with a network of stores whose very uniformity and
predictability attracts customers. In short, the modem franchisee pays not
only for the right to use a trademark but for the right to become part of a
system whose business methods virtually guarantee his success. It is often
unrealistic to view a franchise agreement as little more than a trademark
license. 146
With this backcloth in place, we can move into the post-Kodak era and
highlight the nexus between franchise structure and operation, on the one
hand, and aftermarket theory, on the other.
III. AFTERMARKET CLAIMS IN THE CONTEXT OF POST-CONTRACTUAL
CHANGES TO A FRANCHISE SYSTEM OR ILLUSORY THIRD-PARTY
PURCHASING RIGHTS
A. Early Post-Kodak Approaches
In recent years, courts have split into two camps, one holding that a
franchisor can have market power 4 7 sufficient to tie (or, as more rarely
alleged nowadays, monopolize an aftermarket for) the purchase of
145. In fact, the court in Principe remarked that "the court's emphasis in [Chicken Delight]
upon the trademark as the essence of a franchise is too restrictive," considering the "realities of
modem franchising." Id; see also supra Part II.D.2.a.
146. Principe, 631 F.2d at 309.
147. "Market power is the power 'to force a purchaser to do something that he would not do in
a competitive market.' It has been defined as 'the ability of a single seller to raise price and
restrict output.' The existence of such power ordinarily is inferred from the seller's possession of
a predominant share of the market." Eastman Kodak v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451,
464 (1992) (citations omitted).
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supplies,14 8 and the other holding the opposite.14 9 These cases are fact-
sensitive, with market definition being outcome determinative. Two cases
at the district court level, Collins v. International Dairy Queen, Inc. 50 and
Queen City Pizza, Inc. v. Domino's Pizza, Inc.,1st amply illustrate this
principle. In Dairy Queen I, the court was willing to consider a narrow
market definition: "soft-serve ice cream" (in which Dairy Queen was the
major franchisor), as opposed to "fast food" (in which Dairy Queen was a
minor franchisor).152 The court ultimately denied Dairy Queen's motion for
summary judgment, in part because there was evidence that Dairy Queen
had a policy of frustrating its franchisees' contractual right to seek approval
of alternative suppliers (which the court viewed as evidence of
"coercion"). 5 3 In Queen City Pizza, franchisees challenged a requirement
that certain products be purchased from an affiliate of the franchisor and-
as in Dairy Queen I-also alleged that a contractual promise to approve
third-party vendors was illusory.154 The court dismissed these allegations
under an antitrust theory because-in its view-a relevant market could
not arise from a franchise agreement.'" This was so because Domino's had
no market power in the franchise business. Thus, the only power at issue
was power flowing from the franchise agreement; accordingly, disputes
arising after the date of the agreement must be resolved under contract law,
not antitrust law.15 6
148. E.g., Collins v. Int'l Dairy Queen, Inc. (Dairy Queen 1), 939 F. Supp. 875, 883 (M.D. Ga.
1996); Wilson v. Mobil Oil Corp., 940 F. Supp. 944, 949 (E.D. La. 1996); see also Lin, supra note
1, at 97-99.
149. E.g., Queen City Pizza, Inc. v. Domino's Pizza, Inc., 922 F. Supp. 1055, 1060 (E.D. Pa.
1996), affd, 124 F.3d 430, 442-43 (3d Cir. 1997); Maris Distrib. Co. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc.,
302 F.3d 1207, 1224 n.1 1 (11th Cir. 2002) (adopting Queen City Pizza line of reasoning and
rejecting Dairy Queen I); Forsyth v. Humana, Inc., 114 F.3d 1467, 1478 (9th Cir. 1997) (adopting
a similar line of reasoning as Queen City Pizza in a non-franchise setting involving employee
health insurance plans); see also Newcal Indus., Inc. v. Ikon Office Solution, 513 F.3d 1038,
1048-50 (9th Cir. 2008) (remarking that under Queen City and Forsyth "the law prohibits an
antitrust claimant from resting on market power that arises solely from contractual rights that
consumers knowingly and voluntarily gave to the defendant").
150. Dairy Queen I, 939 F. Supp. at 875, 877 (addressing the Sherman Act section I tying
claims); Collins v. Int'l Dairy Queen, Inc. (Dairy Queen 11), 980 F. Supp. 1252, 1254 (M.D. Ga.
1997) (addressing the Sherman Act section 2 monopolize or attempt to monopolize claims).
151. 922 F. Supp. at 1055.
152. Dairy Queen 1, 939 F. Supp. at 880.
153. Id. at 884.
154. 922 F. Supp. at 1059.
155. Id. at 1062. The court in Dairy Queen I, however, explicitly rejected "the view of the
Queen City court that franchisees under an existing franchise agreement cannot under any
circumstance demonstrate the existence of an illegal tying arrangement." 939 F. Supp. at 883.
156. Queen City Pizza, 922 F. Supp. at 1062.
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B. More Recent Approaches
To the general conclusion regarding potential tying and aftermarket
monopolization claims, one must note, however, one caveat (and a
significant one at that): although a franchisor may require purchases of its
products and limit direct purchases in the first instance, post-contractual
changes in purchasing policies may be problematic. This is so because
some courts have more easily found separate markets for purposes of a
tying analysis once a party is "locked in."' 57 In the franchise context, this
means that--once a franchisee has purchased its franchise and invested time
and money into its success-the franchisee is no longer truly free to walk
away. For example, in Dairy Queen II, the court found that:
Plaintiffs have shown that Dairy Queen franchisees make significant
financial investments in their franchises. The franchise agreements are
long-term agreements which extend for as long as twenty years and
provide for renewal as well as for the opportunity to participate in multiple
store option programs at no additional franchise fee. Defendants retain the
right to terminate or to refuse to renew a franchise agreement if the
franchisee fails to carry the full authorized menu of food products or fails
to meet defendants' product quality standards. If defendants terminate or
refuse to renew a franchise agreement because of a franchisee's lack of
compliance with the limitations imposed by IDQ/ADQ, the franchisee will
face the significant costs of abandoning his investments, including the
franchise fee and real property or leasehold improvements, and he will
lose the multi-store option. If he decides to switch to a competing
franchise system, he will be required to make significant additional
investments in that system. Thus, the ability of a Dairy Queen franchisee
to react to the increase in prices caused by defendants' suppression of
competition in the relevant market by switching to a competing franchise
or other business opportunity may be curtailed or prevented by financial
considerations which lock him in to the existing restrictions and
limitations. 158
Other courts have, however, rejected this analytical approach and
deemed Kodak inapplicable:
In Kodak, the plaintiff-repair service organizations alleged that Kodak
refused to provide them with specialized replacement parts, thereby
forcing Kodak equipment owners to use only Kodak's repair services. In
157. See Eastman Kodak v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 476-77 (1992); Little
Caesar Enters., Inc. v. Smith, 34 F. Supp. 2d 459, 508-09 (E.D. Mich. 1998); Dairy Queen II, 980
F. Supp. at 1260-61.
158. Dairy Queen II, 980 F. Supp. at 1260; see also Subsolutions, Inc. v. Doctor's Assocs.,
Inc., 62 F. Supp. 2d 616, 626 (D. Conn. 1999) (finding that the plaintiffs "alleged sufficient facts
to make out a 'lock-in' claim").
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allowing the plaintiffs' claims to go forward, the Court rejected Kodak's
argument that a single brand or product can never be a relevant market for
antitrust purposes, holding that, under certain circumstances, "one brand
of a product can constitute a separate market." Unlike the present case,
however, the service market for Kodak equipment arose due to the unique
nature of the Kodak machines, and not by virtue of a valid and binding
franchise agreement. And as we have concluded above, antitrust claims
predicated upon a "relevant market" defined by the bounds of a franchise
agreement are not cognizable. Thus, the amended complaint fails not
because the purported relevant market arises from a single brand of a
product, but because the "market" was created by virtue of the franchise
agreements Plaintiffs freely entered.' 59
In a typical situation, a disgruntled franchisee's argument would be that
once it is locked into a franchise, it no longer-as a practical matter-has
the ability to walk away if, for instance, a renewal contract or a post-
contractual change in company policy requires additional purchases of the
franchisor's products (or, conversely, restricts sales of third-party
products).' 60 Given this uncertainty in the law, a franchisor faces, at a
minimum, a significant litigation risk (i.e., plaintiffs will likely sue on this
type of claim and the franchisor will incur substantial defense costs) from
existing franchisees under a lock-in theory. Indeed, it seems that franchise
litigation under Kodak theories has hardened around the single issue of
when a franchisee learns that it must purchase something from its
franchisor that it would prefer to purchase elsewhere.161
To understand how courts have arrived at this point, a review of the
Third Circuit opinion in Queen City Pizza will show how this corner of the
law was first staked out.162  When the dispute arose, Domino's was the
second-largest pizza company in the United States, with about 700
company-owned stores and 3500 franchisee-owned stores.163  The
franchisees were all subject to a standard franchise agreement, which
provided, among many other things, that the franchisor "may in our sole
159. Queen City Pizza, 922 F. Supp. at 1062-63 (citations omitted).
160. See Little Caesar, 34 F. Supp. 2d at 462 (declaring that one requirement for a narrowed
market definition under Kodak is that plaintiff must show that "after a substantial number of
customers have sunk significant costs that are not recoverable and face other switching costs, the
seller takes some action changing its policy (or acting on a prior undisclosed policy) that takes
advantage of its locked in customers' lack of information in order 'to reap supracompetitive
profits' by imposing a burdensome tie-in").
161. E.g., Queen City Pizza, 124 F.3d at 430; Exxon Corp. v. Super. Ct., 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 195,
204 (Ct. App. 1997) (holding for tying claim market power must be judged at the pre-contract
stage rather than before a lock-in has occurred).
162. 124 F.3d at 433.
163. Id.
272 [Vol. 40
2010] LEGACY OF KODAK AND QUEEN CITY PIZZA
discretion require that ingredients, supplies and materials used in the
preparation, packaging, and delivery of pizza be purchased exclusively
from us or from approved suppliers or distributors."'6 Domino's also
reserved the right "to impose reasonable limitations on the number of
approved suppliers or distributors of any product."165 All these restrictions
were subject to a "reasonable judgment" standard.'6 6
Under this system, Domino's sold about ninety percent of $500 million
in ingredients and supplies; these sales formed a significant part of
Domino's corporate profits.167 With the exception of dough, Domino's did
not manufacture these products; rather, it purchased the products from
approved suppliers and resold them to franchisees at a markup.168 The suit
arose because, simply put, Domino's took a series of actions designed to
prevent franchisees from purchasing or self-manufacturing dough, other
ingredients, and supplies at more favorable prices.169 As a result, plaintiffs'
alleged that each franchisee store paid between $3,000 and $10,000 more
for ingredients and supplies than it would in a fully competitive market.170
Plaintiffs sued under several antitrust theories, including monopolization,
tying, and exclusive dealing, none of which enjoyed any success.171
As a threshold matter, the court held that each of the plaintiffs' theories
required pleading and proof of a relevant market in which Domino's
exercised unlawful power.172 To make this showing, plaintiffs needed to
demonstrate that their proposed market definition (viz., "ingredients,
supplies, and distribution services used by and in the operation of Domino's
stores") included all reasonably interchangeable products.' The court held
that the proposed definition was far too narrow:
Here, the dough, tomato sauce, and paper cups that meet Domino's Pizza,
Inc. standards and are used by Domino's stores are interchangeable with
dough, sauce and cups available from other suppliers and used by other
pizza companies. Indeed, it is the availability of interchangeable
ingredients of comparable quality from other suppliers, at lower cost, that
motivates this lawsuit. Thus, the relevant market, which is defined to
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. (providing that Domino's Pizza must "exercise reasonable judgment with respect to
all determinations to be made by us under the terms of this Agreement").
167. Id.
168. Queen City Pizza, 124 F.3d at 433-34.
169. Id. at 434.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 436.
172. Id.at438-41.
173. Id. at 437.
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include all reasonably interchangeable products, cannot be restricted
solely to those products currently approved by Domino's Pizza, Inc. for
use by Domino's franchisees. For that reason, we must reject plaintiffs'
proposed relevant market. 174
Plaintiffs sought to save their sinking boat by invoking Kodak as an
exception to the ordinary strictures of market pleading:
But Kodak does not hold that the existence of information and switching
costs alone, such as those faced by the Domino's franchisees,1 75 renders
an otherwise invalid relevant market valid. In Kodak, the repair parts
and service were unique and there was a question of fact about cross-
elasticity. Judgment as a matter of law was therefore inappropriate. Here,
it is uncontroverted that Domino's approved supplies and ingredients are
fully interchangeable in all relevant respects with other pizza supplies
outside the proposed relevant market. For this reason, dismissal of the
plaintiffs' claim as a matter of law is appropriate. 77
Most important for our discussion, the court went on to distinguish
Kodak in a temporal way that-at least in cases with well-drafted franchise
agreements and clear pre-franchise disclosures-makes it very difficult to
proceed with a franchise aftermarket claim:
The Kodak case arose out of concerns about unilateral changes in Kodak's
parts and repairs policies. When the copiers were first sold, Kodak relied
on purchasers to obtain service from independent service providers. Later,
it chose to use its power over the market in unique replacement parts to
squeeze the independent service providers out of the repair market and to
force copier purchasers to obtain service directly from Kodak, at higher
cost. Because this change in policy was not foreseen at the time of sale,
buyers had no ability to calculate these higher costs at the time of purchase
and incorporate them into their purchase decision. In contrast, plaintiffs
here knew that Domino's Pizza retained significant power over their
ability to purchase cheaper supplies from alternative sources because that
174. Queen City Pizza, 124 F.3d at 438.
175. A franchisee considering exiting one franchise system faces information costs associated
with researching alternative investment opportunities and switching costs stemming from the loss
of invested funds that may not be recovered if it abandons its current business and start-up costs
associated with the new venture. Id. at 439 n.9.
176.
If Kodak repair parts had not been unique, but rather, could be obtained from additional
sources at a reasonable price, Kodak could not have forced copier purchasers to buy repair
parts from Kodak. This would be tmne even if the copier purchasers faced information and
switching costs that locked them into to use of Kodak copiers. This fact indicates that
switching and information costs alone cannot create market power. Rather, it is the lack of a
competitive market in the object to be purchased-for instance, a competitive market in
Kodak parts-that gives a company market power.
Id. at 439 n.10
177. Id. at 439-40.
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authority was spelled out in detail in section 12.2 of the standard franchise
agreement. Unlike the plaintiffs in Kodak, the Domino's franchisees
could assess the potential costs and economic risks at the time they signed
the franchise agreement. The franchise transaction between Domino's
Pizza, Inc. and plaintiffs was subjected to competition at the pre-contract
stage. That cannot be said of the conduct challenged in Kodak because it
was not authorized by contract terms disclosed at the time of the original
transaction. Kodak's sale of its product involved no contractual
framework for continuing relations with the purchaser. But a franchise
agreement regulating supplies, inspections, and quality standards
structures an ongoing relationship between franchisor and franchisee
designed to maintain good will. 17
After Queen City Pizza, the break line between sustainable and
unsustainable antitrust claims brought under a lock-in theory appears to be
whether the franchisor either: (a) concealed its policies at the time of
contracting, or (b) changed them thereafter.179 This is a fact-sensitive issue,
and one that is often hotly contested.180 It thus behooves us to examine in
detail a range of recent cases that exemplify one side or the other of the
dichotomy. We should also bear in mind that-although courts refer to the
situation as one turning on Kodak-franchise cases typically do not involve
an aftermarket with multiple components (e.g., parts and services, as in
Kodak itself).18' The problem no doubt stems largely from the Delphic
quality of Kodak's pronouncements, and we must await the further
elaboration of higher courts to sort out whether a single-aspect aftermarket
should qualify for Kodak treatment at all, particularly given that the cases
in the (admittedly small) sample of currently active litigation proceed solely
on section 1 tying theories. For now, we must simply note that there is a
fork in the road and both branches need exploration, representatives of
which follow.
178. Id. at 440.
179. See id.
180. See, e.g., Mich. Division-Monument Builders of N. Am. v. Mich. Cemetery Ass'n, 524
F.3d 726, 737 (6th Cir. 2008); PSI Repair Servs., Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 104 F.3d 811, 820 (6th
Cir. 1997).
181. Instead, in franchise cases, products identified by a trademark are usually considered to
be the same as the products which bear them. See e.g., Queen City Pizza, 124 F.3d at 430, 439.
This does not stop franchisees, however, from alleging that the franchise trademark and the goods
that the franchisor provides in the aftermarket are two separate products. See, e.g., Collins v. Int'l
Dairy Queen, Inc. (Dairy Queen 1), 939 F. Supp. 875, 879 (M.D. Ga. 1996); Wilson v. Mobil Oil
Corp., 940 F. Supp. 944, 950 (E.D. La. 1996); see also McDavid & Steuer, supra note 1, at 217.
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Robert Burda began to acquire Wendy's hamburger franchises in the
mid-1 990s.182  The parties ultimately executed thirteen separate Unit
Franchise Agreements.'8 3 Although Burda owned the land upon which his
franchises were located, an agreement with Wendy's restricted his use of
the land solely to the operation of Wendy's stores.'8 Thus, were Burda to
cease his franchise enterprise, he could not convert the stores to another use
and would have to sell the properties to a buyer that Wendy's approved or
to Wendy's itself.185  According to Burda, this locked him in as a
franchisee, a situation that Wendy's was able to exploit by foisting
unwanted and supracompetively priced supplies on him. 8 6
Prior to 1997, Burda purchased hamburger buns from a bakery of his
choosing. But in 1997, Wendy's insisted that he change suppliers and
purchase all his buns from a Wendy's subsidiary.'18  Wendy's backed its
insistence with a threat to terminate Burda if he refused to comply.1 89
Burda claimed that he had no knowledge of a potential obligation to buy
buns from the Wendy's-owned bakery and, therefore, he had no way to
incorporate the costs of the overpriced buns into his initial calculation of the
potential return on investment in his Wendy's franchises.' 90 As a result, he
and other franchisees saw reduced profits, and competition in the market for
hamburger buns was injured.' 9 ' In a similar vein, Burda complained that
when he first acquired a Wendy's franchise, there were a number of
Wendy's-approved food suppliers, and Burda was able to force competitive
bidding between two of them in his region.19 2 This competition ended in
2004, when Wendy's granted exclusive food-supply rights to one of those
suppliers, to which Wendy's guaranteed a minimum profit and promised to
impose a surcharge on food supplies purchased elsewhere.'9 3 Burda alleged
that none of this was at arm's length because Wendy's had an economic
182. Burda v. Wendy's Int'l, Inc., 659 F. Supp. 2d 928, 930 (S.D. Ohio 2009). Because the
opinion is drafted in the context of a motion to dismiss, the facts stated are merely alleged, not
proven.
183. Id. at 930-31.
184. Id. at 931.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 930-32.
187. Id. at 931.
188. Burda, 659 F. Supp. 2d at 931.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
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interest in the exclusive supplier.19 4 As with the buns, Burda maintained
that he had no knowledge of a potential obligation to buy from an exclusive
supplier in pricing his initial investment, an eventuality that raised his food
costs by 4 percent and reduced his cash flow by $360,000.'9s
Wendy's responded that none of this stated an antitrust claim because
(1) Burda had not adequately pled a relevant market or that Wendy's had
market power either generally or under a Kodak lock-in theory, (2) Burda's
obligation to purchase buns and food supplies from particular vendors arose
under contract rather than from market power, and (3) the statute of
limitations barred all claims.'96 The first two objections are relevant to our
discussion, so we will examine them in turn, but we must remember that
they are really just two aspects of a single inquiry: namely, "What does the
agreement say?"
Wendy's argued that although Burda had alleged tied products, he had
not alleged a cognizable tying product over which Wendy's had power.197
Burda countered that the franchise itself was the tying product.'98 The court
agreed, finding that-in a lock-in case-market power exists once a
purchaser buys one product and is forced to buy another because of the
seller's rules.'99 But the court tempered this broad statement with the now-
familiar statement that "[t]he assertion of an antitrust claim under a Kodak
lock-in theory 'requires specific factual allegations in the complaint that the
defendant either changed its rules after the initial sale was made or
concealed its rules from its customers."' 20 0  Wendy's alleged that its
agreements with Burda fully disclosed its policies, thus disposing of his
claims as a matter of law. 20 ' Burda argued, to the contrary, that the
agreement disclosed nothing going to that point and that a reasonable
franchisee reviewing the agreement ex ante, "would not have foreseen that
194. See Burda, 659 F. Supp. 2d at 931.
195. Id. at 932.
196. Id. at 933.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 934.
200. Burda, 659 F. Supp. 2d at 935 (citing Mich. Div.-Monument Builders of N. Am. v. Mich.
Cemetery Ass'n, 524 F.3d 726, 737 (6th Cir. 2008)); see also PSI Repair Servs., Inc. v.
Honeywell, Inc., 104 F.3d 811, 820-21 (6th Cir. 1997) (plaintiffs failed to prove Kodak-type lock-
in theory because there were "no allegations that [the defendant] changed its parts-restrictive
policy in order to lock-in customers, nor has [the plaintiff] alleged that [the defendant's] policy
was not generally known").
201. Burda, 659 F. Supp. 2d at 935.
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Wendy's would impose exclusive suppliers of these products on its
franchisees." 2 02 Here's what the agreement said:
Franchisee shall purchase all food items, ingredients, supplies, materials,
and other products used or offered for sale at the Restaurant solely from
suppliers ... who demonstrate, to the continuing reasonable satisfaction of
Franchisor, the ability meet Franchisor's then-current standards and
specifications for such items; who possess adequate quality controls and
capacity to supply Franchisee's needs promptly and reliably; and who
have been approved in writing by Franchisor prior to any purchases by
Franchisee from any such supplier, and have not thereafter been
disapproved. If Franchisee desires to purchase any products from an
unapproved supplier, Franchisee shall submit to Franchisor a written
request for such approval. Franchisee shall not purchase from ay [sic]
supplier until, and unless, such supplier has been approved in writing by
Franchisor.203
The court agreed with Burda's reading of this provision.204 The court
stated, "There is no language in this section that would put a potential
franchisee on notice that Defendants would be able to eliminate all
competition by naming an exclusive supplier or that they could impose a
surcharge on approved suppliers."20 s Instead, according to the court, "the
language suggests that supplier competition was welcome so long as
prospective suppliers met Defendants' 'standards and specifications,' and
'possess[ed] adequate quality controls and capacity to supply Franchisee's
needs."' 2 0 6 And because the market for supplies was competitive prior to
the naming of an exclusive bun supplier and the levying of the surcharge on
approved (but disfavored) suppliers, the court held that Burda had satisfied
the change-of-policy "requirement" of a Kodak claim.207
Wendy's second argument-namely, that the forced purchases arose
from contract, not market power-was easily dispatched, for the same
reasons as the first.20 8 Again, this was because the supplier provision in the
franchise agreements "did not contain language putting a potential
franchisee on notice that Defendants would be able [to] eliminate all
competition by naming an exclusive supplier or that they could impose a
surcharge on approved suppliers, especially in light of the allegations that
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 935-36.
207. Burda, 659 F. Supp. 2d at 936.
208. See id. at 936-37.
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the market for these supplies was competitive prior to the alleged tie." 20 9 in
this way, the court found that Burda had slipped the Queen City Pizza knot
because in its franchise agreement, Domino's reserved the option
exclusively to provide its franchisees' supplies (and was in fact under the
franchise agreement "the exclusive seller of approximately 90% of the
ingredients and supplies used by Domino's franchisees"), whereas in
Burda's case Wendy's had done no such thing.210
At bottom, then, Burda stands for two related propositions. First, a
Kodak claim will lie when a franchisor takes over an aftermarket for
supplies and the possibility of that takeover was not adequately disclosed in
21the franchise agreement.21 Second, a Queen City Pizza defense to a Kodak
claim will not lie in that situation, either.m This symmetry suggests that-
although courts and litigants will no doubt continue to argue Kodak and
Queen City Pizza as distinct issues-the inquiries are better thought of as a
single deep question: namely, "Did the power to force aftermarket
purchases arise before or after the parties entered into their franchise
agreement?" If the answer is "after," then the antitrust issues will become
more complicated, as indeed the Kodak line of cases reveal. 2 13 But if the
answer is "before," then, more than likely, that will be the end of the road
for the plaintiff as Queen City Pizza and an ongoing line of cases brought
by Quiznos sandwich-shop franchisees reveal. 214
Although there are a number of franchise antitrust cases pending
against Quiznos, 215 Westerfield v. Quizno's Franchise Co., LLC is
representative of the antitrust claims brought in the various cases, as well as
the approach that the other courts take to them.216 In Westerfield, the
209. Id at 936.
210. Id. at 936-37; see also Trane U.S. Inc. v. Meehan, 563 F. Supp. 2d 743, 755-56 (N.D.
Ohio 2008) (passing on issue of whether franchisee was locked-in by the franchise agreement, but
noting that the Sixth Circuit has not followed Queen City Pizza and has instead recognized that
"franchise agreements can create markets in which the franchisor has market power" because the
franchisor did not disclose relevant policies at the time of signing (citing Little Caesar Enters., Inc.
v. Smith, 34 F. Supp. 2d 513, 519 (E.D. Mich. 1998)).
211. Burda, 659 F. Supp. 2d at 936-37.
212. See id.
213. See text and accompanying notes supra Parts IH.A, 1.B.
214. See text and accompanying notes supra Part III.B.
215. A very recent opinion in Martrano v. Quizno's Franchise Co., LLC, No. 08-0932, 2009
WL 1704469, at *2-3 & n.6 (W.D. Pa. June 15, 2009), summarizes much of the parallel litigation.
Its analysis of the antitrust claims follows Westerfield. See id at *2, *8; see also Bonanno v.
Quizno's Franchise Co., LLC., No. 06-cv-02358, 2009 WL 1068744 (D. Colo. Apr. 20, 2009).
216. 527 F. Supp. 2d 840, 856-59 (E.D. Wisc. 2007), vacated in part, No. 06-C-1210, 2008
WL 2512467, at *11 (E.D. Wis. Apr. 16, 2008) (vacating the dismissal of plaintiffs' RICO and
fraud claims, but not disturbing the dismissal of the antitrust claims).
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plaintiffs alleged that "Quiznos illegally tie[d] the sale of their franchises
(the tying product) to the subsequent sale of the 'Essential Goods' required
to operate the franchises (the tied product)." 2 17 To buttress this allegation,
plaintiffs further alleged that "because Quiznos enjoys substantial market
power in the 'Quick Service Toasted Sandwich Restaurant Franchise'
market, the tying arrangement under which its franchisees must purchase
Essential Goods from its affiliates or approved suppliers is unlawful." 218
Unsurprisingly, then, the court went straight to the issue of markets and
market power.
The court took a two-part approach. First, it debunked any notion that
Quiznos had power in the franchise market, stating, "In the area of
franchises such as Quiznos, the relevant product market would include
equivalent investment opportunities." 2 20 In reaching this conclusion, the
court was adopting the position that Alan Silberman had expounded in an
influential law-review article a decade before:
From the perspective of sound analysis and consistency with the
fundamental legal principle, it is patent that-at the minimum-a
franchisor market power assessment requires reference to all alternatives
available to the potential consumer in a broad line of business endeavors.
In many cases this will extend to the market for franchises of all types or
the employment of capital. For market power to exist there must be
something that shows that, pre-contract, the seller had the power to force a
potential franchisee to purchase something that would not have occurred
in a competitive market-a requirement drawn directly from Jefferson
Parish [Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde, 446 U.S. 2 (1984)].221
For the court, this proposition ended the matter: "Considered in this
light, plaintiffs' assertion that the 'Quick Service Toasted Sandwich
Restaurant Franchise' market constitutes the relevant product market in
which to assess Quiznos' market power is patently absurd." 22 2 The court's
reasoning here was that, ex ante, Quiznos had no power to coerce a
reasonable investor to choose its franchise over another:
217. Id. at 856-57.
218. Id at 857.
219. See id. at 857-59.
220. Id. at 858.
221. Alan H. Silberman, The Myths of Franchise "Market Power", 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 181,
206 (1996); see also George A. Hay, Is the Glass Half-Empty or Half-Full?: Reflections on the
Kodak Case, 62 ANTITRUST L.J. 177, 188 (1993) ("There are literally thousands of franchise
opportunities available to prospective investors, and federal law operates to ensure that
prospective investors are given information about the likely costs and revenues of a particular
franchise opportunity in order to help them make an informed choice.").
222. Westfield, 527 F. Supp. 2d at 858.
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It may well be that that Quiznos holds substantial market power for those
investors who wish to purchase a fast food franchise that sells toasted
submarine sandwiches. But that's like saying that the seller of any
franchise known for a particular product has market power over investors
who are already determined to sell such a product. That cannot be the
test.223
Next, the court moved to an examination of plaintiffs' complaint-in-
fact: Did Quiznos violate the Sherman Act by directing plaintiffs'
aftermarket purchases? 224  It held in the negative and tacitly found that
(unlike Burda) Quiznos had not changed its aftermarket policies:
It is true that after plaintiffs became Quiznos franchisees, Quiznos was
able to determine the suppliers from whom plaintiffs were required to
purchase the products and services needed to operate the franchises. The
gist of plaintiffs' complaint is that Quiznos exercised this authority so as
to extract exorbitant payments from them. But this was due to the
contractual provisions of the Franchise Agreement each of the plaintiffs
signed, not Quiznos' market power. This is not the kind of harm the
Sherman Act was intended to prevent .... Having chosen to become
Quiznos franchisees, plaintiffs are bound by the terms of the franchise
agreements they signed. 225
Thus, following Queen City Pizza, the court concluded that a remedy for
the alleged overcharges must sound, if at all, in contract, not antitrust.2 26
At bottom, then, franchise lock-in claims will stand or fall according to
the source of the complained-of restriction, when it came into being, and
whether it was disclosed. In practice, this means that a clear contractual
provision will evicerate an antitrust claim brought under a lock-in theory.
It's all a matter of timing. For as two recent commentators have put it,
223. Id.
224. Id. Although the court "le[ft] aside the question of whether a franchise can be a tying
product," it appeared to believe that that is a dubious proposition, albeit one that need not be
reached in this particular case. Id.
225. See id. at 859.
226. Id A common variation on this takes place when a franchisee of a branded-products
store complains that the franchisor does not permit it to sell non-branded products. Courts have
tended to follow Queen City Pizza in this situation, which makes good sense. For if a fast-food
franchisor can direct its franchisees' purchases of ingredients (of which a rational purchaser would
be indifferent, so long as the end product conforms), then, afortiori, a franchisor should be able to
limit its franchisees' sales of non-branded products. In addition to the obvious free-rider problem,
the franchisor could inherit products-liability claims or suffer image tarnishment from illicit,
defective, or scandalous products. For two approaches to Queen City Pizza within the branded-
product context, see Mumford v. GNC Franchising LLC, 437 F. Supp. 2d 344, 359 (W.D. Pa.
2006) and Bishop v. GNC Franchising LLC, 403 F. Supp. 2d 411, 420 (W.D. Pa. 2005). In the
interest of full disclosure, I was one of counsel in these two cases.
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[F]ranchise and dealership arrangements generally do not give rise to lock-
in because the primary and aftermarket obligations are accepted
simultaneously. Franchisee or dealership plaintiffs frequently attempt to
utilize the lock-in argument to nullify their subsequent contract
obligations. But this use of lock-in is misplaced. If a franchisee does not
like the aftermarket terms of a franchise agreement, the franchisee is free
to reject the contract and is not forced to fulfill undesired contractual
obligations. In this respect, the franchisee has information available to him
at the time of contracting, which defeats a Kodak-style lock-in claim. To
put it another way, the fact that in contract claims the decision to enter the
aftermarket is made simultaneously with the primary market decision
undermines any lock-in claim because the plaintiff is on notice of the
extent of its aftermarket obligations at the time of contracting. A lock-in
claim cannot succeed if the plaintiff was aware of what the obligations
were and then agreed to them.
C. Price Discrimination in the Franchise Context
In addition to claiming that a franchisor has unduly restricted its
franchisees' sources and supplies of aftermarket products, franchisees
sometimes claim that a dual-distributing franchisor (i.e., one that both
franchises and owns stores) unlawfully discriminates in price between its
company-owned stores and those of its franchisees. 2 28 This claim is usually
pled as a violation of the Robinson-Patman Act, which-subject to
numerous rule-swallowing exceptions-makes it illegal to (1) sell a
commodity to two different purchasers at two different prices at the same
time, (2) where the effect of the discrimination is to injure competition.229
If we assume that a plaintiff can plead and prove a case that is otherwise
actionable, a single fundamental question remains: is an intercorporate
transaction a "sale" for purposes of the Robinson-Patman Act?
227. David AJ. Goldfine & Kenneth M. Vorrasi, The Fall ofKodak Afiermarket Doctrine:
Dying a Slow Death in the Lower Courts, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 209, 221 (2004).
228. See, e.g., Mumford, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 360-62 (no violation of Robinson-Patman Act
when a franchisor sold products to company-owned stores at lower prices than to franchisees
because the sales to the company-owned stores were transfers within a single enterprise and thus
were not two separate sales as the Act requires). Such claims are however, rather infrequent as
there is likely little incentive for franchisors to discriminate against franchisees when the
franchisees are their only class of customers. See 2 GARNER, supra note 5, § 11:34; see also
Stuart Hershman, Revisiting the Robinson-Patman Act in the Franchise Supply Setting, 16
FRANCHISE L.J. 57, 76-77 (1996)
229. 15 U.S.C § 13(a) (2006); Brook Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509
U.S. 209,219-20 (1993).
282 [Vol. 40
2010] LEGACY OF KODAK AND QUEEN CITY PIZZA
To answer this question, we must first look at more general antitrust
policy. For most purposes, a parent company and its wholly-owned
subsidiary are treated as a single economic entity. This issue first arose
when courts were called upon to decide whether a parent and subsidiary
could "conspire" in violation of the Sherman Act.23 0 The United States
Supreme Court eventually brought finality to the debate and held-at least
where the subsidiary is wholly owned-that they cannot.231 Many courts
have applied this single-economic-unit line of reasoning to parent-
subsidiary transfers.2 32 Not surprisingly, then, franchisees have gained little
ground when attempting to challenge the prices at which a franchisor
"sells" to its wholly-owned stores.2 33
CONCLUSION
The overarching lesson that we must take from recent franchise
antitrust litigation is that the Kodak Court's factual observation that Kodak
230. E.g., Ogilvie v. Fotomat Corp., 641 F.2d 581, 588-90 (8th Cir. 1981); Las Vegas Sun,
Inc. v. Summa Corp., 610 F.2d 614, 617-18 (9th Cir. 1979); Photovest Corp. v. Fotomat Corp.,
606 F.2d 704, 726-27 (7th Cir. 1979). In each case, the courts focused on the "separateness" of
the subsidiary from the parent in terms of control, daily operations, officers, and headquarters.
231. Copperweld Corp. v. Indep. Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 776 (1984). In Copperweld, the
Supreme Court stated that when "applied to a wholly owned subsidiary, the so-called 'single
entity' test is thus inadequate to preserve the Sherman Act's distinction between unilateral and
concerted conduct." Id. at 772 n.18. Rather, "the basic fact [is] that the ultimate interests of the
subsidiary and the parent are identical, so the parent and the subsidiary must be viewed as a single
economic unit." Id.
232. E.g., Caribe BMW, Inc. v. Bayerische Motoren Werke Aktiengesellschaft, 19 F.3d 745
(1st Cir. 1994) (parent and wholly-owned subsidiary are one seller for purposes of Robinson-
Patman Act); City of Mt. Pleasant, Iowa v. Associated Elec. Corp., Inc., 838 F.2d 268, 278-79
(8th Cir. 1988) ("To hold that this transfer is a sale under the Robinson-Patman Act would be to
make antitrust liability hinge on the happenstance of the enterprise's internal organization . . . .");
Russ' Kwik Car Wash v. Marathon Petroleum Co., 772 F.2d 214, 221 (6th Cir. 1985) ("[T]he
parent and subsidiary are a single economic unit. The Robinson-Patman Act is not concerned
with transfers between them."); Sec. Tire & Rubber Co. v. Gates Rubber Co., 598 F.2d 962, 967
(5th Cir. 1979) ("Intra-corporate transfers and transfers between parent and wholly-owned
subsidiary are not the type of transactions the Robinson-Patman Act meant to regulate."). But see
Zoslaw v. MCA Distribut. Corp., 693 F.2d 870, 879 (9th Cir. 1982) ("Sales to [wholly-owned]
subsidiaries . . . do not necessarily remove such transactions from Robinson-Patman
jurisdiction.").
233. See Mumford, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 360-62 ("sales" to company-owned stores are really
transfers and "[t]he coordinated activity of a parent and its wholly owned subsidiary in the form of
transfers between them has been read to not support a price discrimination claim under the
Robinson-Patman Act"); Bishop, 403 F. Supp. 2d at 420-21 (Robinson-Patman Act claim fails
because the "transfer of commodities between [a parent and wholly-owned subsidiary is]
insufficient to constitute a 'sale' under the Act"). The Bishop Court also held that there is no
"conspiracy" claim available under the Robinson-Patman Act. Id. at 424-25.
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had changed its policies with respect to aftermarket parts and services has
hardened into a legal rule in the context of franchise aftermarket disputes.
Whether that rule is wise or whether it will hold over time remains to be
seen, but it does lend a present measure of Holmesian predictability to
franchise relationships. And the teaching point is a simple one: franchisors
wanting to minimize antitrust risk and maintain (or maintain the potential
for) aftermarket control should disclose that fact in their offering materials
(typically referred to as UFOCs) and specifically contract for that right.
Even then, with the relevant legal propositions in mind, the franchisor
should carefully consider whether (1) its policies are reasonably necessary
to its method of distributing its products, (2) its aftermarket policies can be
crafted so that they are not actually "exclusive," and (3) the market for its
products is sufficiently competitive and filled with interchangeable
products.
Franchisees, on the other hand, should bargain for whatever
aftermarket control they want or, failing that, either discount what they are
willing to pay for a franchise or walk away and onto the next opportunity.
Either way, the parties are then protected by contract law in the case of a
dispute, which is a simpler and much more cost-effective method of dispute
resolution than is antitrust law.
284 [Vol. 40
